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absentee of the pendency of the action or unless such absentee was
otherwise informed of the proceedings within the statutory period
during which non-resident defendants served by publication may come
in and defend. E.G.L.
TAXATION OF SEATS ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE
The prevailing concept of "property" is often rudely tested in taxa-
tion cases. The rules laid down in statutes and decisions have often
been constructed with the idea that property is a physical res-an
object of sensation. As such, property would always have a "situs
" -
a relation in space to other objects of sense. But a chose in action is
also property, although it is not a thing or res-an object of sense.
Our concept of property has shifted; incorporeal rights have become
property.' And finally, "property" has ceased to describe any res,
or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal
relations-rights, powers, privileges, immunities. Such is the case
whether these relations affect the consumption and enjoyment of
some particular object of sense or not.
It appears that the power of a state to levy a tax often depends upon
the "situs" of property. We tax "property" whether it is tangible
or intangible. Whenever the power to tax depends upon situs, we are
compelled to find a situs for that which under accepted definitions
can have none.
In Anderson v. Durr (1921) 42 Sup. Ct. 15,2 the United States
Supreme Court held that a seat on the New York Stock Exchange is
property and may be taxed in Ohio, where its owner lived, without
running counter to the Fourteenth Amendment, in spite of the fact
that it may also be taxed in New York. Mr. Justice Pitney finds that
membership in the Exchange includes the privilege of buying and sell-
ing in the Exchange building; the power of assignment "with quali-
fications"; a contractual right that the business of the association shall
be conducted properly; a right that in dealings with other members
commissions shall be determined by a definite rule; a privilege of
holding oneself out in Ohio as a member and thereby inducing business;
and some interest in the capital stock of a New York corporation own-
ing the land and building in New York City, valued in excess of
A right is never corporeal. Mr. Justice Holmes remarks in his dissent in the
case now under discussion: "All rights are intangible personal relations. .. ."
Anderson v. Durr (1921) 42 Sup. Ct 15, 18. The same shift that occurred as to
"property" no doubt also occurred as to "chose in action." A chose is a thing,
and no doubt chose in action once meant some specific object of sense the possession
and enjoyment of which might necessitate an action at law.
'Afflrming (igi) ioo Ohio St. 251, 126 N. E. 57. See COMMENTS (1920) 29
YALE LAW JouRNAL, 916, discussing the Ohio decision and analysing the "property"
involved.
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$5,o0o,ooo. This valuable taxable property is not wholly situated in
New York. "The membership is personal property, and being without
fixed situs has a taxable situs at the domicil of the owner. Mobilia
sequuntur personam."3
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented in an opinion of one paragraph.4 "The
fact that all rights are intangible personal relations" does not give Ohio
the power to tax either land or personal property "permanently out of
the jurisdiction." He seeks for an " object of the right" and he finds
it in the New York Stock Exchange building. All else is merely inci-
dental to the "right . . . . personally to enter . . . and to do busi-
ness there." Thus the property is "localized in New York. If so, it
does not matter whether it is real or personal property or that it adds to
the owner's credit and facilities in Ohio. The same would be true of
a great estate in New York land."
The analysis adopted by-the majority of the Court indicates that some
of the legal relations of the owner of a seat have no connection with
the New York building as an "object." They do not constitute prop-
erty in the building. The power of Ohio to tax them is scarcely to
be denied merely on the ground that they are "incidental."
A state taxes property because it maintains machinery for determin-
ing the existence of rights and privileges, lending its force and machin-
ery to compel performance by those bearing duties and refusing them
as against those having privileges. We believe that those should pay
who reap the advantage, and that they should pay in proportion to the
number and value of their advantages. Whether in the case of land,
of chattels, or of choses in action, eveyry state holds its machinery ready
for all comers. A resident of Ohio who owns New York land or a
New York chattel or who makes a New York contract has Ohio rights
as well as New York rights, and has Oregon rights as well as Ohio
rights. These various rights (and other relations) are not necessarily
identical in either number or character. Shall each state therefore
have the power to tax? In theory, yes; and the amount of the tax to
be paid each state should be determined by the value received from
each state. Practically, however, such a system would be too compli-
cated and expensive. 5 The states that, in general, render the greatest
'Anderson v. Durr, supra at p. 17.
What are the mobilia in this case and how do they follow the domicil? Do the
New York rights and privileges cross an intervening state and turn into Ohio
rights and privileges? Apparently some of them do not. "Nor is plaintiff's case
stronger if we assume that the membership privileges exercisable locally in New
York enable that State to tax them even as against a resident of Ohio. Exemption
from double taxation by one and the same State is not guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment; much less is taxation by two States upon identical or closely
related property interests falling within the jurisdiction of both, forbidden."
'Ibid. 18. Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds concurring.
"It may seem surprising that a person who has "property" in any one state has
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service are the states where the object or res is located and the state of
the owner's domicil. Upon one or both of these states is conferred the
power to tax, generally to the exclusion of others. The principle upon
which the choice is made is not always obvious to a non-expert.6 The
present decision, giving to both states the power to tax, is not in con-
flict with previous decisions and is not unreasonable.
A. L. C.
AGREEMENTS FOR FICTITIOUS BIDS AT AUCTIONS
The courts generally agree that a puffer at an auction is unworthy
of his hire.' His employment is considered a fraud on honest bid-
ders.2 Thus the general rule is that in a "sale without reserve" the
employment of a puffer renders the sale voidable at the election of
the bona fide purchaser.3 The same result should be reached. in a
"sale to the highest bidder," for at common law it was considered as
a sale without reserve.4 There is a representation to the public that
property in forty states: and it may be disturbing to an already unduly harassed
property owner to be told that there is- a theory by which he may be taxed in forty
jurisdictions. The fact is, however, that the question is merely one of sound social
policy. There may be some comfort in the assurance that there is'still a constitu-
tion, and that the time has not yet arrived when it is regarded as "reactionary"
to believe that confiscation is not sound social policy.
It is not in the least surprising, however, for an Ohio owner of a seat on the
Exchange in New York to learn that he has rights in New York and in Oregon as
well as in Ohio, and that Oregon holds its courts and its united strength ready for
his service in the same way that Ohio does. All that is necessary is that service of
process and other jurisdictional facts should exist. The "rights" recognized and
enforced in Oregon may differ in various respects from those in Ohio and in New
York. For example, New York may have available procedure in rein that is not
available in the other states, and a contract held valid in Ohio may be held invalid
in Oregon. But there is property in each state, even though it is not identically
the same property.
'Thus, bank deposits are taxable in two states, although the depositor has only
a chose in action. Fidelity & C. T. Co. v. Louisville (1917) 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup.
Ct. 40. And although inobilia sequintur personam and are taxable at the owner's
domicil, it seems that they cannot be taxed there if they acquire a "permanent"
location in another state, such "permanency" being possible even though they
remain movable. Union Transit Co. v. Kenticky (19o5) i99 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct.
36. Consider also inheritance and stock transfer taxes.
'Dealy v. Land Co. (1913) 21 Calif. App. 39, 130 Pac. io66; Walker v. Night-
ingale (1726, H. L.) 3 Brown P. C. 263.
2National Bank v. Sprague (i869) 20 N. J. Eq. i59; Veazie v. Williains (i85o,
U. S.) 8 How. 134.
'Howard v. Castle (1796, K. B.) 6 T. R. 642; Thornet v. Haines (1846) 15
L. J. Exch. 23o; Veazie v. Williams, supra note 2; cf. Gregory v. U. S. Fidelity
Co. (1904, Sup. Ct.) 45 Misc. 112, 91 N. Y. Supp. 595. The seller cannot avoid
a sale where he has employed a puffer. Troughton v. Johnson (1804) 3 N. C.
328.
"Benjamin, Sales (6th ed. 192o) 549; Parfitt v. Jepson (1877) L. J. C. P. 529.
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